Dissertation Awards
1-1-2018

The Effects of Partial Employment Protection Reforms: Evidence
from Italy (joint with Sabrina Di Addario and Diego Daruich)
Raffaele Saggio
University of California - Berkeley

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/dissertation_awards

The Effects of Partial Employment
Protection Reforms: Evidence
from Italy
Raffaele Saggio
(with Sabrina Di Addario and Diego Daruich)
Concerns over labor market flexibility have been at the
center of the European political debate for the past three
decades (see, e.g., Nickell [1997]). In response to the widespread belief that rigid employment protection laws (EPLs)
depress employment, many countries—including France,
Spain, and Italy—undertook reforms that substantially
relaxed legal constraints on the use of temporary employment contracts. Importantly, however, these reforms were
often only partial in that the degree of employment protection granted to workers hired via permanent employment
contracts remained unchanged.
Economic theory delivers ambiguous predictions on the
effects of such partial reforms of EPL. Several studies have
noted that such reforms in principle could generate higher
overall employment and improved labor market efficiency,
or alternatively they could lead to a substitution of permanent contracts with rotating temporary contracts and little or
no net gain in employment (Bentolila and Saint-Paul 1992;
Blanchard and Landier 2002; Cahuc and Postel-Vinay 2002).
Some studies even suggest that partial reforms could end
up increasing the bargaining power of incumbent workers,
usually hired via permanent contracts, thus enhancing the
“insider-outsider” gap (Bentolila and Dolado 1994).
Empirical assessments of these policy changes have
mainly used cross-country research designs with aggregate
data (Bertola 1990; Garibaldi and Violante 2005; Lazear
1990). A few recent studies have conducted within-country
before-and-after studies, focusing on firm-level aggregates
(e.g., Autor, Kerr, and Kugler 2007; Cappellari, Dell’Aringa,
and Leonardi 2012). While informative, an analysis of firm
aggregates cannot directly address the effect of the reforms
on job duration or on the rate of transition between temporary and permanent contracts, both of which are crucial to
understanding the full impact of these institutional changes
(Cahuc, Charlot, and Malherbet 2016; Güell and Petrongolo
2007). A firm-level analysis also ignores any distributional
impact arising from the differential treatment of the reform
on new versus incumbent workers (Boeri 2011).
In this dissertation, my coauthors, Sabrina Di Addario
and Diego Daruich, and I use detailed Italian social security
records matched with firm financial data and a differencein-differences research design to provide a comprehensive
empirical evaluation of an Italian reform signed into law in
2001. This reform facilitated the usage of temporary con-
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tracts, while maintaining existing employment protections
for workers with permanent contracts.
Longitudinal data on jobs, firms, and workers permit us
to answer three fundamental questions on the impact of this
policy change: 1) How did the reform affect overall employment and labor income? 2) What factors contributed to the
success or failure of the law in raising employment and earnings? 3) Were there heterogeneous effects across different
worker and firm groups?
In Chapters 1 and 2 of the dissertation we find that, contrary to the stated intent of the law (Biagi and Sacconi 2001),
the reform had little or no effect on aggregate employment
and led to a decline in average earnings. We explain these
results by showing that after the reform the Italian labor
market became increasingly segmented: more workers were
trapped in cycles of low-paid and fragile temporary jobs
where the likelihood of transitioning from temporary to permanent jobs fell substantially. On the other hand, consistent
with the intention of the law, average firm labor costs fell
and mapped into significant increases in profits. The reform
generated both winners and losers: its primary beneficiaries
were firms, their shareholders and managers, as well as older
incumbent workers. By contrast, the earnings of younger
workers and new entrants were substantially depressed following the policy change, and this widened the intercohort
gaps among Italian workers (Naticchioni, Raitano, and
Vittori 2016). Chapter 3 shows that a potential mechanism to
explain these distributional impacts is the large difference in
bargaining power between temporary contract workers and
permanent ones.
The policy evaluation conducted in Chapters 1 and 2 of
this dissertation builds on the work of Cappellari, Dell’Aringa, and Leonardi (2012) and exploits the staggered implementation of the reform across different collective bargaining agreements (Contratti Collettivi Nazionali del Lavoro;
CCNL henceforth). While Cappellari et al. rely on eight
CCNLs and survey information on firms’ sector to infer the
passage of the reform, we exploit the fact that Italian social
security records directly report each worker’s CCNL. These
unique data allow us to account for the fact that firms can
hire employees covered by different CCNLs (Card, Devicienti, and Maida 2014; Devicienti, Fanfani, and Maida 2016).
We combine this information with novel data on the renewals
of 121 Italian collective bargaining agreements to infer the
reform status for over 50 million person-year observations,
which are subsequently matched with the universe of financial records of Italian limited liability companies. We show
that outcomes follow parallel trends prior to the implementation of the reform, indicating that observations from CCNLs
yet to be reformed can be used to gauge counterfactual outcomes for observations in reformed CCNLs in the absence
of the reform. Relatedly, we show that there is relatively
little endogenous sorting of workers across different CCNLs
in response to the reform, and that the composition of new
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entrants before and after the policy change is well balanced
across a large set of observable individual characteristics.
To guide our empirical analysis, in Chapter 1 we develop
a search and matching model based on Cahuc, Charlot, and
Malherbet (2016) that captures the dynamic incentives of
reforms to employment protection. The model suggests that
partial EPL reforms can generate both intended and unintended consequences. The latter are driven by the increase in
the turnover of temporary jobs, as this type of policy change
reduces incentives to sign longer temporary contracts as well
as to convert workers originally hired under a temporary
contract to a permanent position. Quantifying the extent of
both intended and unintended consequences and their overall
impact on workers and firms is the objective of our empirical
analysis.
Chapter 1 presents the effects of the reform on jobs. We
find that, consistent with the intended consequences of the
law, the reform fostered job creation and increased the share
of new jobs signed under a temporary contract. Offsetting
this rise in job creation, however, we find that the rate of
separation for workers hired under a temporary contract
increased after the reform. This change was primarily driven
by decreases in the probability that a temporary contract is
renewed and mapped into significant increases in the transition rate from a temporary contract in one year to nonemployment in the next year. We also find that, after the
reform, most new jobs were filled by workers who came
directly from another job (i.e., a job-to-job transition) rather
than by workers coming from nonemployment. Looking
more closely at the jobs themselves, we find that, after the
passage of the reform, the total number of days worked
under a temporary contract decreased by approximately 5
percent. This effect resulted in an increase in the difference
in earnings between permanent and temporary contract of
around 10 percent following the reform.
Chapter 2 describes the impact of the reform on firms
and workers. Starting with firms, we find that firm profit
margins, defined as profits divided by value added, increased
following the policy change by approximately 5 percent.
This increase in profits stemmed primarily from a decrease
in labor costs per worker rather than increases in value
added. Indeed, we estimate that the average gap in annual
labor costs between temporary and permanent workers to
be approximately 16,500 euros. Average firm size did not
change significantly after the reform, suggesting that firms
primarily substituted permanent positions with temporary
ones, although there is some indication that this change led
to a decrease in value added. This highlights a trade-off
between lower labor costs and lower productivity in firms’
decisions to utilize temporary contracts (Weil 2014).
The decrease in labor costs and increased utilization of
temporary contracts is also associated with a rise in within-firm earnings inequality. We find that the reform raised
the within-firm standard deviation of earnings by approxi-
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mately 4 percent. Moreover, the within-firm pay gap between
young and older workers also increased by 4.5 percent.
Interestingly, the overall wage bill paid to managers and
their average compensation both increase after the reform.
This suggests that the increase in profits following the policy
change may have been partially redistributed to managers.
Chapter 2 then presents estimates of the impacts of the
reform on workers. We find that the reform has close to null
effect on the probability to be employed, which is consistent
with our theoretical framework and the previously described
effects of the policy on the dynamics of job destruction and
creation. On average, however, workers earned less after the
reform, with a substantial rise in the pay gap between incumbent permanent workers, who had higher earnings following
the reform, and incumbent temporary workers, who suffered
an average earnings loss of up to 5 percent following the
policy change. These losses are primarily driven to decreases
in the probability that incumbent temporary workers were
converted to permanent contracts by their employers after the
reform.
Longitudinal data on workers permit us to isolate the
dynamic effects of the reform on new entrants. Young individuals who entered the labor market after the reform earned
between 3.5 and 7 percent less in the first year of entry
compared to those who had entered in the prereform regime.
These estimates persisted up to the seventh year following entry in the labor market and mapped into cumulative
present discounted value losses ranging from 1,000 to 4,000
euros, depending on the cohort analyzed. We show that these
negative estimates were not due to compositional changes
or selective entry of workers based on the reform status.
Instead, postreform-entering cohorts were disproportionately
more likely to be “trapped” during their careers in temporary
jobs where firms had possibly fewer incentives to provide
on-the-job training (Cabrales, Dolado, and Mora 2014).
In the last chapter of the dissertation, we abstract from the
effect of the reform and focus on the economic forces behind
the substantial gap in daily wages between permanent and
temporary workers. Informed by our results on within-firm
inequality and by the large underrepresentation of temporary
contract workers within unions (Bentolila and Dolado 1994;
Lani 2013), we concentrate on the role of employers’ pay
policies in generating a contract wage gap (Card, Cardoso,
and Kline 2016). Exploiting within-person daily wage
changes for workers who transitioned from a temporary to a
permanent contract within the same employer, we find that
temporary workers received only 66 percent of the rents traditionally shared by firms with permanent workers. This difference in rent sharing explains 75 percent of the raw wage
return when transitioning from a temporary to a permanent
contract within the same employer.
This dissertation contributes to the following strands of
the literature. Our analysis of firms provides new evidence
on the role of employment protection in the performance of
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firms (Autor, Kerr, and Kugler 2007; Cappellari, Dell’Aringa, and Leonardi 2012; Cingano et al. 2016), a relationship
characterized by mixed empirical results that has received
a considerable amount of theoretical attention (Boeri and
Garibaldi 2007; Lagos 2006). We also establish a previously unexplored link between institutional reforms aimed
at facilitating the creation of temporary work arrangements
and increases in within-firm inequality (Card, Cardoso, and
Klein 2013; DiNardo, Fortin, and Lemieux 1996; Song et al.,
forthcoming).
Our analysis of job flows in Chapter 1 provides new quasi-experimental evidence of the role of labor market flexibility and temporary contracts in the dynamics of job creation
and destruction. This relationship has typically been studied
by either comparing cross-country aggregates (Bassanini and
Marianna 2009; Bertola 1990; Bertola and Rogerson 1997;
Boeri 1999) or relying on individual data based on surveys
combined with selection on observable techniques (Bover
and Gómez 2004; Gagliarducci 2005; Güell and Petrongolo
2007; Picchio 2008). Focusing on individual transitions
across employers and employment contracts permits us to
decompose the responses of job creation and destruction to
the policy change. Moreover, we can also test crucial predictions from our model, such as the negative impact of the
reform on the likelihood of converting temporary contracts
to permanent ones. We also document how partial reforms
targeting only the employment protection of temporary contracts map into a widening of the duality in key labor market
outcomes across employment contracts. These findings
connect to an older literature that examines the existence
and consequences of dual labor markets (Dickens and Lang
1985; Rebitzer and Taylor 1991).
The worker-level analysis of Chapter 2 contributes to the
literature that examines the impact of partial labor market
reforms on individual outcomes (see Boeri [2011] for a
review). We highlight the distributional impacts of these
reforms across different individuals. We also provide new
insights into the question of whether temporary contracts
represent stepping stones into the labor market or a trap that
hinders the development of the career of young workers, a
question characterized by mixed empirical evidence (Autor
and Houseman 2010; Blanchard and Landier 2002; Booth,
Francesconi, and Frank 2002; Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini
2008). Our examination of the consequences of entering the
labor market under the new policy regime connects to studies
that analyze how entry conditions affect short- and long-term
earnings (Kahn 2010; Oreopoulos, von Wachter, and Heisz
2012) and is related to recent work of García-Pérez, Castelló,
and Marinescu (2016), who study a reform similar to the one
analyzed here for Spanish male high school dropouts.
Finally, Chapter 3 provides new evidence for the existence of a permanent contract premium in wages (Kahn
2016) using an event-study design that zooms into the
within-person, within-employer return of transitioning from
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a temporary to a permanent contract. We show that a major
explanation for the large return associated with this transition
is that firm-specific rents are not distributed equally between
temporary and permanent workers within the same firm. This
last finding contributes to a nascent literature that shows
how firms are increasingly redrawing their boundaries, often
by making use of alternative types of work arrangements,
such as temporary employment contracts, in an attempt to
limit the degree of rent sharing to a group of core employees
(Goldschmidt and Schmieder 2017; Kahneman, Knetsch, and
Thaler 1986; Katz and Krueger 2016; Weil 2014;).
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